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THE ARCHITECTURE OF BENEFICENCE: AN 





While much work has been done in recent decades to restore the centrality 
of  beauty to its rightful place in constructive theology, such an aesthetic turn, 
as I will note in this article, is far from problem-free. Specifically, suspicions 
about the ideological character of  aesthetics have been voiced by a number 
of  postmodern thinkers, for whom the identification of  beauty and justice—
already present in pre-Socratic cosmogonies—is irrevocably dissolved. The 
broader assumption underwriting my approach is that such dislocations of  
beauty from goodness, when transposed to the religious sphere, are but 
contemporary modulations of  the “Great Controversy” theme central to 
Seventh-day Adventist theology and piety.1 After delineating the basic contours 
of  this problematic, I will turn to Jonathan Edwards’s Trinitarian aesthetics 
and its rich relational ontology in an attempt to provide a constructive 
engagement with these issues. While retaining reservations about certain 
aspects of  his thought, I will nevertheless suggest that his understanding of  
the nature of  true beauty adds an important voice to current debates. In the 
final section of  the article, I will turn to a theological interpretation of  Andrei 
Rublev’s Trinity icon as a form of  art to help me further elaborate on Edwards’s 
proposal, eventually pointing to the biblical Sabbath as a possible focal point 
for a distinctive Adventist approach to theological aesthetics. The account of  
theodramatic beauty that will be articulated in that context, furnishes us with a 
credible apologetic platform from which a response to (postmodern) qualms 
about the ethical viability of  beauty can be cogently crafted.
Genealogies of  Beauty
“We can be sure that whoever sneers at [beauty’s] name as if  she were an 
ornament of  a bourgeois past . . . can no longer pray and soon will no longer 
be able to love,”2 so writes Hans Urs von Balthasar in the opening pages of  his 
1The “Great Controversy” concept as present in Adventist discourse is a 
shorthand expression for the cosmological conflict between good and evil as evidenced 
in salvation history.
2Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of  the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, vol. 1: 
Seeing the Form, trans. Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis, ed. Joseph Fessio and John Riches (San 
Francisco: Ignatius, 1982), 18.
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magnum opus, The Glory of  the Lord. With a virtually unmatched erudition and 
depth of  insight, Balthasar weaves an intricate philosophical, theological, and 
historical account, tracing the marginalization of  beauty in Christian theology. 
He observes how, among other things, “the word ‘aesthetic’ automatically 
flows from the pens of  both Protestant and Catholic writers when they want 
to describe an attitude which, in the last analysis, they find to be frivolous, 
merely curious and self-indulgent.”3 Balthasar laments such deaesthetization of  
theology and its adverse effects on the Christian practices of  worship, spiritual 
formation, and evangelism. After all, he argues, “in a world without beauty . . . 
the good also loses its attractiveness, self-evidence why it must be carried out.” 
Why not prefer evil over good? “Why not investigate Satan’s depth?”4 
Fortunately, much has changed in regard to the treatment of  beauty as 
a key theological category since Balthasar first voiced his clarion call. The 
steady outflow of  scholarly literature dealing with various questions of  
theological aesthetics clearly attests to an increased attention given to this 
important conundrum.5 Yet the evocation of  beauty for Christian theology 
remains fraught with significant challenges. The rejection of  beauty in 
favor of  the postmodern sublime, the commodification of  beauty in our 
hypersignified culture, the mass media diffusion of  the aesthetic ideal into 
an “absolute and unstoppable polytheism of  Beauty,”6 the feminist critique 
of  beauty as a vestige of  patriarchal exploitation, the Protestant suspicions 
of  beauty as a “meretricious Hellenistic import,”7 the sociohistorical location 
of  taste, the unavoidable dialectic of  subjective/objective entailed in any 
aesthetic perception, the frequent degeneration of  beauty into self-indulgent 
sentimentality8—these and other sardonic dismissals present serious 
challenges of  how to speak of  beauty in any meaningful way. Beauty is simply 
too nebulous, as it seems, too tame, too easily complicit with oppression and 
evil, too escapist in the face of  rampant injustice to be able to function as a 
3Ibid., 1:51.
4Ibid., 1:19.
5Note, e.g., Edward Farley, Faith and Beauty: A Theological Aesthetic (Burlington: 
Ashgate, 2001); Richard Viladesau, Theological Aesthetics: God in Imagination, Beauty, and 
Art (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); John Navone, Toward a Theology of  Beauty 
(Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1996); Jeremy Begbie, Resounding Truth: Christian Witness 
in the World of  Music (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2007).
6Umberto Eco, History of  Beauty, trans. Alastair McEwen (New York: Rizzoli, 
2004), 428.
7Patrick Sherry, “The Beauty of  God the Holy Spirit,” Theology Today 64 (2007): 
12.
8Jeremy Begbie offers a helpful delineation of  sentimentality in “Beauty, 
Sentimentality, and the Arts,” in The Beauty of  God: Theology and the Arts, ed. Mark 
Husbands, Daniel J. Treier, and Roger Lundin (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2006).
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central theological category. It would thus appear that in contrast to the other 
two transcendentals—the truth and the good—beauty is not in the position 
to claim invariable and unconditional beneficence.9 As Roman Guardini 
rightly puts it, “Beauty ought to be reserved only for that which is valid, good, 
and true, and in a certain sense it is so—but the other aspect of  beauty is also 
undeniable and disturbing, namely that it is not in fact so, and that it can shine 
forth in evil, in disorder, in indifference, and even in stupidity.”10
The tenuous way in which beauty and justice are related is well illustrated, 
in Peter Cohen’s documentary, The Architecture of  Doom, in which the 
calamitous connection of  beauty and evil is hauntingly explored. More than 
just chronicling the different ways in which art both reflected and informed 
the Weltanschauung of  the Nazi elite, the film is a well-documented exposé 
of  National Socialism as a “pervasive manifestation of  a perverse aesthetic 
doctrine: to make the world beautiful by doing violence to it.”11 As Cohen 
poignantly shows, the concoction of  Hitler’s genocidal madness led him to 
decry “doom as art’s highest expression.” What a triumph of  the grotesque! 
No special measure of  moral astuteness is required to tag such a chilling 
amorality of  beauty as positively deviant and ghastly.
Given this and other, perhaps less drastic, examples of  the misuse of  
beauty, it does not come as a surprise that some postmodern thinkers are highly 
suspicious of  rhetorical sublimations of  beauty, seeing them as invariably 
doomed to deconstructive implosions. In response, various “detoxification 
therapies” are proposed intent on uncovering the interplay of  vested interests 
embedded in ostensibly innocuous appeals to beauty.12 Pierre Bourdieu’s 
sociological analysis, for example, leads him to assert that the aesthetic sphere 
is never one of  innocent enjoyment and simple human pleasure. Aesthetics 
is always deeply political in that a set of  values is established “according to 
which the dominant class automatically comes out on top. Their political and 
natural supremacy is recast as natural supremacy.”13 Given the exploitative 
9For an illuminating account of  how beauty came to be considered as one of  the 
transcendentals of  being during the Middle Ages, see Umberto Eco, Art and Beauty in 
the Middle Ages (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), chap. 2.
10Romano Guardini, Dostoevsky: Il mondo religioso, 4th ed. (Bresica: Morcelliana, 
1995), 289, cited in Bruno Forte, The Portal of  Beauty: Towards a Theology of  Aesthetics, 
trans. David Glenday and Paul McPartlan (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 45. Again, 
this is not a novel observation. Already in Leonardo da Vinci we find the statement 
that “beauty is not always good.” See Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz, History of  Aesthetics, 
trans. Adam and Ann Czerniawski (New York: Continuum, 2005), 3:131.
11Benjamin Forgey, “The Architecture of  Doom,” Washington Post, 22 February 
1992.
12See Farley, 7.
13John Armstrong, The Secret Power of  Beauty: Why Happiness Is in the Eye of  the 
Beholder (New York: Penguin, 2004), 98. For an extended discussion of  this issue, 
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character of  the aesthetic, even seemingly laudatory endeavors such as art 
education, have a menacing undertone to them. The very cultivation of  art 
means that we are “constructing a cruel instrument for exclusion. In loving 
beauty we are not—as we may have innocently supposed—doing something 
essentially good.”14 Beauty, in other words, is not what it appears to be. 
Admittedly, I find much sympathy with such cautionary remarks, 
particularly when broader issues of  economic exploitation are brought to 
the table. The project of  genealogical uncovering is certainly not inimical to 
the task of  Christian theology; in fact, it is principally invited and welcomed 
by it. After all, Christianity is a religion informed by a deep realism about 
the fallenness of  the world and its proclivities to violence and untruth, 
and, as such, carries a strong presumption against viewing reality, including 
beauty, through rose-tinted glasses. My reservations begin to emerge, 
however, when such deconstructive strategies become hostage to forms 
of  essentialist discourse—“such and such always amounts to such and 
such”—and, in the process, succumb to an unmitigated apotheosis of  scope 
that posits strife and malevolence as foundational cosmic principles. 
Gilles Deleuze serves as a case in point. In his nocturnal revisionism, the 
apocalyptic vision of  the New Jerusalem becomes an ultimate embodiment 
of  panoptical oppression. Its streets of  gold and precious stones amount 
to nothing less than an “architecture of  doom”—a ploy intended to hide 
the fact of  an “all-encompassing control of  society by the state.”15 Thus 
what Christians would see as embodying the ultimate outpouring of  divine 
benevolence is stunningly transmuted into or “uncovered” as the final 
takeover of  a totalitarian regime; an apokalypsis indeed. Deleuze writes:
The Apocalypse is not a concentration camp (Antichrist); it is the 
great military, police, and civil security of  the new State (the Heavenly 
Jerusalem). . . . The New Jerusalem, with its wall and its great street of  
glass, is an architectural terror. . . . Involuntarily, the Apocalypse at least 
persuades us that what is most terrifying is not the Antichrist, but this new 
city descended from heaven, the holy city “prepared like a bride adorned 
for her husband.” All relatively healthy readers of  the Apocalypse will feel 
they are already in the lake of  sulfur.16
see Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of  the Judgment of  Taste (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1984). See also Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of  the Aesthetic 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).
14Armstrong, 98.
15Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of  Identity, Otherness, 
and Reconciliation (Nashville: Abingdon, 1996), 287.
16Gilles Deleuze, “Nietzsche and Saint Paul, Lawrence and John of  Patmos,” 
in Essays Critical and Clinical (Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press, 1997). Cf. 
Volf, 287.
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It does not take much to see the specter of  Friedrich Nietzsche looming 
here in a menacing fashion. After all, for him Christianity’s self-presentation as 
an announcement of  peace masks a sinister calculus at work, camouflaging as 
a “will to power at its most vulgar and debased: power representing itself  as 
the refusal of  power, as the negation of  strife, as the evangel of  perfect peace—
only in order to make itself  stronger, more terrifying, more invincible.”17 
Such a stance is understandable in light of  Nietzsche’s genealogy that renders 
“every regime of  power as necessarily unjust. . . . No universals are ascribed to 
human society save one: that it is always a field of  warfare.”18 In contemporary 
philosophy such deconstructive suspicions are expressed by Jacques Derrida, 
who claims that any act of  hospitality, regardless of  its aesthetic appeal, 
inevitably hides subterranean proclivities toward violence and exclusion. 
Hospitality, and more fundamentally giving, is always a part, however oblique, 
of  an “economy of  exchange” that is never fully extricated from narcissistic 
impulses. Clearly, the wider philosophical assumption at work here is that the 
moment you have a concrete expectation, a determinate future, or the moment 
you speak about a definite “presence”—in other words, the moment you have 
any sort of  determinacy of  content, being, proclamation, or expectation—the 
shadow of  totality emerges. Thus John Caputo’s claim that he cannot envision 
“how any religious tradition or theological language can take shape without 
violence,”19 because “as soon as a confession or institution takes on a particular, 
determinate shape, it is necessarily exclusionary and therefore violent.”20 
One cannot but see these sentiments pointing in the direction of  
Genesis 3—I am speaking hyperbolically here, of  course. There the serpent’s 
strategy, part of  it anyway, is one of  dislodging beauty from the idea of  a 
primordial good or hospitality21 only to be cast as an ideological cover for 
17David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of  the Infinite: The Aesthetics of  Christian Truth 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 102.
18John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Cambridge: 
Blackwell, 1991), 281-282. For an extended treatment of  Nietzsche’s version of  “piety” 
and “redemption,” see Bruce Ellis Benson, Pious Nietzsche: Decadence and Dionysian Faith 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008); and Giles Fraser, Redeeming Nietzsche: 
On the Piety of  Unbelief (London: Routledge, 2002).
19John D. Caputo, “What Do I Do When I Love My God? Deconstruction 
and Radical Orthodoxy,” in Questioning God, ed. Michael Scanlon, John D. Caputo, 
and Mark Dooley (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 307, cited in 
James K. A. Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-Secular Theology 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), 116.
20Smith, 116. This is Smith’s restatement of  Caputo’s position.
21As I will develop it more clearly in the subsequent section of  this article, I 
am employing the world “hospitality” to name concrete actualizations of  benevolent 
intent.
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oppressive intent.22 God’s gifting, so it is argued, is simply a modality of  
seductive beauty; an exercise in hypernarcissism, hiding stratified proclivities 
toward totalitarian domination. Thus in Gen 3:1 we find, however implicitly, 
a primordial transvaluation of  beauty. Yes, the garden is beautiful; you may 
enjoy its harmonious fruitfulness; yes, you are free to delight in its pleasure-
affording richness, but beware! All of  it simply masks a sinister antihumanistic 
ontotheology, a veritable “architecture of  doom.” Do not be tricked by the 
ultimate Purveyor of  “Turkish Delight”—to evoke C. S. Lewis’s famed The 
Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe for a moment. The hospitality offered by 
the White Witch is but a subterfuge of  an “omnivorous empire”23 built on 
“original strife.” Adam and Eve, of  course, assent to the serpent’s twisted 
“genealogy”—an act of  a proto-Nietzschean deconstruction one could say—
and the rest is, pun intended, (human) history.
Undoubtedly, these issues concerning the relationship of  aesthetic 
persuasion and agential intent are of  enormous significance not only for 
theology, but for Christian praxis as well. As one can easily attest, scarcely 
any element of  the church’s apologetic, kerygmatic, diaconical, missional, and 
formative task is left untouched by some modulation of  this problematic. 
After all, the deep underlying issue here—the correlation of  God and human 
flourishing—is one that profoundly informs all these considerations and 
endeavors.24 With that in mind, a number of  questions need to be addressed: 
What is the relationship of  the good and the beautiful, if  any? What do we 
mean by beauty and, specifically, the “beauty of  the Lord”? Is an apologetics 
of  beauty possible at all? After all, “who is to say,” to borrow from Hart, 
“that the beautiful is self-evidently free of  violence or subterfuge? How can 
one plausibly argue that ‘beauty’ does not serve the very strategy of  power to 
which it supposedly constitutes an alternative?”25 
Quite clearly, it is impossible to address the full range of  those concerns 
here. My goal is a more modest one in that I simply want to suggest one 
possible, yet hopefully plausible approach. Specifically, I want to engage some 
key insights of  Edwards’s Trinitarian aesthetics as they pertain to the topic at 
hand. As is widely known, the relationship of  the good and the beautiful as 
it relates to the doctrine of  God and to wider metaphysical considerations is 
22See, e.g., Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, 
trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), 75ff.
23Hart, 2.
24Unfortunately, there is not sufficient space here to engage more fully the seminal 
study by Robert Merrihew Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Some of  the central claims of  this article deeply 
resonate with his account of  moral and nonmoral excellencies in relation to God as 
the ultimate Good.
25Hart, 4.
293the Architecture of Beneficence . . . 
something that occupied Edwards for the better part of  his life. My broader 
goal in doing so here is to propose a conceptual appropriation of  a traditional 
Adventist philosophy of  history—in the sense of  a harmonious and faithful 
development of  its thematic cantus firmus—in order to unearth some plausible 
ways in which its theological and philosophical markers might be employed to 
address postmodern critiques of  Christian metadiscourse and its incarnational 
particularity.
 
Jonathan Edwards’s Vision of  Hospitable Beauty
In his helpful overview of  theological aesthetics, Faith and Beauty, Edward 
Farley notes how in Edwards’s thought 
beauty is more central and more pervasive than in any other text in the 
history of  Christian theology. Edwards does not just theologize about 
beauty: beauty (loveliness, sweetness) is the fundamental motif  through 
which he understands the world, God, virtue and ‘divine things.’26 
Roland Delattre seconds this observation when he writes that 
“beauty is one of  the things Jonathan Edwards was most concerned with 
understanding.”27 For Edwards beauty is “the first principle of  being,” “the 
measure and objective foundation of  the perfection of  being—of  excellence, 
goodness, and value,” “the first among the perfections of  God,” “a major 
clue to his doctrine of  the Trinity” as well as his anthropology, “the central 
clue to the meaning of  conversion” and personal holiness, and the nature of  
true virtue.28 In other words, beauty for Edwards is not simply incidental to 
how we are to think about the nature and character of  God, or the structure 
of  reality in general. Rather, it should be seen as the key ontological category 
through which other coordinates of  being, such as unity, truth, and goodness 
are mapped out.
As is widely known, Edwards’s intricate theological aesthetics rests on 
a differentiation between two kinds of  beauty. First, he posits a secondary 
or natural beauty that greatly resembles the “great theory” in aesthetics,29 
famously encapsulated in Thomas Aquinas’s definition of  beauty as integrity 
or completeness (integritas), right proportion or harmony (proportio), and 
radiance or resplendence (claritas).30 Edwards defines secondary beauty as 
26Farley, 43.
27Roland André Delattre, Beauty and Sensibility in the Thought of  Jonathan Edwards 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 1.
28See ibid., 2.
29See Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz, “The Great Theory of  Beauty and Its Decline,” 
Journal of  Aesthetics and Art Criticism 31 (1972), cited in Begbie, 20.
30See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of  the English Dominican 
Province (Allen: Christian Classics, 1981), Ia, Q. 39, A. 8. 
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“mutual consent and agreement of  different things, in form, manner, quantity, 
and visible end or design; called by the various names of  regularity, order, 
uniformity, symmetry, proportion, harmony, etc.”31 Notably, and I take this to 
be an essential point, such beauty is manifested not only in material objects, 
but also in the right-ordering of  society and the practice of  justice.32 
That such beauty would possess a sacramental character is self-evident 
to Edwards. His stand on this issue echoes a long intellectual tradition 
resembling, among others, different modalities of  Pythagorean, Platonic, 
Neoplatonic, and, of  course, Christian thought. Long indeed is the list of  
philosophers and theologians who have reflected on beauty—specifically 
transcendental beauty—as a sacramental manifestation of  God’s presence, 
variously articulating the core idea that “beauty happens when the Whole 
offers itself  in the fragment,”33 the idea that in encountering beauty, we 
encounter, however dimly, the Source of  beauty himself.34 The fifteenth-
century Neoplatonist Marsillio Ficino, for example, notes how “by its utility, 
harmony, and decorativeness, the world testifies to the skill of  the divine artist 
and is proof  that God is indeed its Maker.”35 Or perhaps one might recall the 
well-known lines from George Herbert’s poem, “The Elixir”:
A man that looks on glass,
On it may stay his eye;
Or if  he pleaseth, through it pass,
And then the heaven espy.36
Similarly, Edwards emphasizes the revelatory capacity of  natural beauty 
precisely because of  its “resemblance of  spiritual beauties.”37 In fact, “that 
beauteous light with which the world is filled in a clear day is a lively shadow 
31Jonathan Edwards, “The Nature of  True Virtue,” in Ethical Writings, ed. Paul 
Ramsey, The Works of  Jonathan Edwards, 8 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 
561-562.
32See ibid., 568-570. This point will be elaborated at greater length below.
33Forte, vii.
34I am aware that this claim immediately thrusts one into the middle of  the 
longstanding debates surrounding, e.g., analogia entis versus analogia fidei, theologia gloriae 
versus theologia crucis. Addressing this problematic, however, goes beyond the scope of  
this article.
35Tatarkiewicz, History of  Aesthetics, 102.
36George Herbert, “The Elixir,” in The Complete English Poems (New York: Penguin, 
2005), 174.
37Jonathan Edwards, “The Beauty of  the World,” in Scientific and Philosophical 
Works, ed. Wallace E. Anderson, The Works of  Jonathan Edwards, 6 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2003), 305.
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of  [Christ’s] spotless holiness and happiness, and delight in communicating 
himself.”38
This, in brief, is how Edwards approaches natural beauty. As is well 
known, however, he does not stop there. There is, after all, a need to speak 
of  beauty beyond the realm of  mere material objects—a point, incidentally, 
already made by thinkers such as Plotinus39 and Boethius.40 Such primary 
or spiritual beauty, as Edwards calls it, bespeaks of  the sort of  “consent” 
or “harmony” appropriate to moral agents, which he goes on to define as 
“benevolence to Being in general”41—that is, a disposition of  well-regard 
not only to the immediate circle of  natural bonds or self  interests, but to 
whatever there is. More than simply being a form of  aesthetic sensibility, 
therefore, beauty is rendered into “propensity and union of  the heart to 
being in general, which is immediately exercised in a general good will.”42 
Beauty, accordingly, is not incidental to hospitality—by which I refer here 
to phenomenological instantiations of  benevolent intent—but is, in fact, its 
desire-evoking “form” or embodiment. It is not something added to the good; 
it is, with some reservation, to be identified with moral rightness or ethical 
self-transcendence.43 In fact, Edwards’s entire aesthetic and metaphysical 
edifice is built on the supposition that “the primary and original beauty or 
excellence that is among minds [or moral agents] is love,”44 in other words, 
benevolent relatedness. In Amy Plantinga Pauw’s words:
Beauty was irreducibly relational for Edwards. His aesthetics “does not, 
therefore, begin with the assumption of  the ontological independence of  
38Jonathan Edwards, The “Miscellanies,” a-500, ed. Thomas A. Shafer, The Works 
of  Jonathan Edwards, 13 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), Misc. 108, 279. For 
a discussion of  how imagination and natural beauty reflect “higher realities,” see C. S. 
Lewis, Surprised by Joy: The Shape of  My Early Life (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995), 
167.
39An interesting comparison, that cannot be developed here, is the one between 
Edwards and Plotinus on the nature of  soul beauty. While they operate on different 
metaphysical assumptions, there are noteworthy similarities in their respective accounts. 
For a helpful summary of  Plotinus, see Armstrong, chap. 8. See also Farley, 20.
40If  “men had the use of  Lynceus’ eyes,” writes Boethius, they would see that 
Alcibiades, “so very handsome on the surface,” was, in fact, “totally ugly once his 
inner parts came into view” (Boethius, The Consolation of  Philosophy [New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999], III.8).
41Edwards, “The Nature of  True Virtue,” 540.
42Ibid.
43On the idea of  “ethical self-transcendence,” see Farley, chap. 5.
44Jonathan Edwards, “The Mind,” in Scientific and Philosophical Works, ed. Wallace 
E. Anderson, The Works of  Jonathan Edwards, 6 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2003), 363; cf. Amy Plantinga Pauw, The Supreme Harmony of  All: The Trinitarian Theology 
of  Jonathan Edwards (Grand Rapids: Eerdmands, 2000), 82.
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the [beautiful] thing; it is not a thing first and only afterwards designated as 
beautiful.” Rather, beauty is a matter of  proportion and harmony within 
the thing itself, and in its relations with other objects. . . . Anything that is 
beautiful exhibits consent and agreement, and so must be [in Edwards’s 
words] “distinguished in a plurality some way or other.” Beauty does require 
complexity.45
That explains why, for Edwards, primary beauty by definition can never 
remain purely internal, purely individualistic. The only exception to this 
basic rule is the being of  “God, Who is being-in-general, both the sum and 
the fountain of  all being” and, therefore, “has primary beauty internal to 
Himself.”46 The Trinitarian subtext of  Edwards’s thought comes clearly to the 
fore here. Since “there is true ‘plurality’ in God,” as Pauw puts it, “there can 
be consent and thus true beauty within the Trinity itself. God’s ‘infinite beauty 
is his infinite mutual love of  himself.’”47
What becomes evident in this context is that Edwards’s metaphysics 
rests on a dynamic reciprocation at the heart of  divine and human gifting. 
He believes that “in the framework of  desire that all creatures possess, self-
love is a logically necessary and unavoidable desire that accompanies any 
attraction, that is, all love is a reflexive desire and need for something that 
we find lovely, worthy, valuable, pleasant or beautiful.”48 Far from being an 
instantiation of  psychological egoism or mercenary interestedness, therefore, 
such appropriate self-love is implicit in this ontology of  participation. It is 
this point that is repeatedly stressed in Edwards’s Dissertation,49 where God’s 
self-glorification is postulated as the ultimate end of  creation. To the charge 
that such claims present a thoroughly narcissistic and megalomaniacal God, 
Edwards simply responds that such a critique quite wrongly feeds off  a barren 
image of  potentia Dei absoluta, betraying a loss of  theological nerve at a crucial 
point. For him, to restate the point already made, divine self-regard is a form 
of  ethical self-transcendence that is synonymous with benevolent consent. 
God is most passionate about his glory, but what characterizes that glory is 
a donative disposition toward his creation. That is to say, God’s self-regard 
45Pauw, 81. The reference in this paragraph is to Stephen H. Daniel, The Philosophy 
of  Jonathan Edwards: A Study in Diverse Semiotics (Bloomington: University of  Indiana 
Press, 1994), 182.
46Delattre, 18.
47Pauw, 83. The reference in this paragraph is to Edwards, “The Mind,” 363.
48William J. Danaher, The Trinitarian Ethics of  Jonathan Edwards (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox, 2004), 24.
49Jonathan Edwards, “Dissertation Concerning the End for Which God Created 
the World,” in Ethical Writings, ed. Paul Ramsey, The Works of  Jonathan Edwards, 8 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).
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and kenotic other-regard perfectly coincide in Edwards’s metaphysical and 
theological scheme.50
A point of  practical intent is worth stressing here. One of  the reasons 
why Edwards is so intent on seeking after beauty is because it points to the 
proper modality of  knowing God. He variously writes of  such knowledge as 
having a “real sense,” “heart knowledge,” or true “apprehension” of  the inner 
beauty of  God as contrasted to a mere noetic grasp. Consider, for example, the 
following statement from his sermon “A Divine and Supernatural Light”:
There is a twofold understanding or knowledge of  good that God has made 
the mind of  man capable of. The first, that which is merely speculative or 
notional: as when a person only speculatively judges. . . . And the other is 
that which consists in the sense of  the heart: as when there is a sense of  the 
beauty, amiableness, or sweetness of  a thing; so that the heart is sensible of  
pleasure and delight in the presence of  the idea of  it.51
Balthasar’s own phenomenology of  spiritual sight strongly resonates with 
Edwards’s sentiments on this issue. For him, “there is something provocative 
and disturbing about the truly beautiful; it cannot simply be admired blandly 
but must be seen and taken in, dealt with.”52 Attraction and assent are fused, so 
to speak, in the moment of  perception. Thus the arresting appeal of  beauty 
fosters a grammar of  ocular metanoia, a conversion of  sight, that is, where 
the beauty of  the Christian gospel overwhelms us with its suasive loveliness, 
gracing us with “the light of  the knowledge of  the glory of  God in the face 
of  Jesus Christ” (2 Cor. 4:6). Here apologetics is “not so much arguing as 
showing.”53 In Balthasar’s words (summarizing Pseudo-Dionysius’s position): 
“No explanation can help him who does not see the beauty [of  God]; no 
‘proof  of  the existence of  God’ can help him who cannot see what is manifest 
to the world; no apologetic can be any use to him for whom the truth that 
radiates from the center of  theology is not evident.”54 In pursuing that line of  
thought, Balthasar sides with Augustine’s contention in his De Libero Arbitrio 
50For a helpful development of  this theme, see Farley, 89.
51Jonathan Edwards, “A Divine and Supernatural Light,” in Sermons and Discourses 
1730-1733, ed. Mark Valeri, The Works of  Jonathan Edwards, 14 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1999), 413-414.
52Robert Barron, And Now I See: A Theology of  Transformation (New York: Crossway, 
1998), 71. 
53Edward T. Oakes, “The Apologetics of  Beauty,” in The Beauty of  God: Theology 
and the Arts, ed. Mark Husbands, Daniel J. Treier, and Roger Lundin (Downers Grove: 
InterVarsity, 2006), 212. 
54Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of  the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, vol. 2, 
Studies in Theological Styles—Clerical Styles, trans. Andrew Louth, Francis McDonagh, 
and Brian McNeil, ed. Joseph Fessio and John Riches (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1983), 
166.
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(On Free Choice) that theology proper is apologetics; once we “see” God for 
who he is in his beauty and glory, Augustine argues, all objections to God fall 
away. To this point, Edwards would gladly accede.  
To summarize, Edwards presents a complex metaphysics in which the 
idea of  beauty plays a key role in the apprehension of  Being as good. His 
version of  the “erotics of  redemption,”55 rooted in the idea of  an eternal 
consent of  being to being within the immanent Trinity, doxologically fuses the 
elements of  beauty and goodness into a cosmic vision of  kenotic hospitality. 
As he so eloquently states in his Dissertation:
God in seeking his glory, therein seeks the good of  his creatures: because 
the emanation of  his glory (which he seeks and delights in, as he delights in 
himself  and his own eternal glory) implies the communicated excellency and 
happiness of  his creature. And that in communicating his fullness for them, 
he does it for himself: because their good, which he seeks, is so much in 
union and communion with himself. God is their good. Their excellency and 
happiness is nothing but the emanation and expression of  God’s glory: God, 
in seeking their glory and happiness, seeks himself: and in seeking himself, 
i.e. himself  diffused and expressed (which he delights in, as he delights in his 
own beauty and fullness), he seeks their glory and happiness.56 
To this vision of  God, I readily assent. On a more critical note, however, 
I feel that a stronger Christological basis would have strengthened Edwards’s 
argument considerably. I do not intend to suggest that Christology is entirely 
absent from his aesthetics—one needs only to recall his landmark sermon, 
“The Excellencies of  Christ”—but I do wish there was a stronger narrative 
component to his edifice. After all, the best response that Christianity can 
give to the subversive logic of  those such as Nietzsche and Deleuze is 
one that comes in the form of  an alternative story, a cruciform aesthetics, 
a metanarrative of  self-giving love dramatically enacted in “God with us,” 
attesting to the unselfing hospitality of  the triune God. I take this to be a point 
of  great importance, and it is one that I would like to develop further through 
an examination of  Andrei Rublev’s painting, Trinity (ca. 1410 A.d.). While it 
is impossible to here do justice to Orthodox iconographic history with its 
various renderings and interpretations of  Genesis 18 (the story of  Abraham’s 
visitation by the three heavenly beings at Mamre), I will nevertheless utilize 
some of  the icon’s profound symbolism to engage some of  the central planks 
of  Edwards’s vision.
God’s Iconic Gesture
Pavel Florensky, in his Iconostasis, offers the following “irrefutable” argument 
for the existence of  God: “There exists the icon of  the Trinity by St Andrei 
55See Graham Ward, Cities of  God (New York: Routledge, 2000), 182-202.
56Edwards, “Dissertation,” 459.
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Rublev; therefore, God exists.”57 Setting aside the validity of  such a “proof ” 
for a moment, intriguing as it is, the theological and spiritual appeal of  this 
fifteenth-century icon is undeniable. Undoubtedly the highest expression of  
Russian Orthodox iconography, the Trinity symbolically represents some of  
the essential elements of  Christian trinitarian theology and aesthetics.58 In 
it, the ousia of  the triune God is represented by the three hypostases of  the 
Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, viewed from left to right. The three 
persons of  the Trinity are perfectly contained within the circumference of  a 
circle, thereby symbolizing the essential oneness of  God. Each figure holds 
a staff, a sign of  authority; has hues of  blue pointing to their eternity; and 
overlapping wings communicating intimacy. They differ in the color of  their 
noninterchangeable garments (chiton and clamys) that point to the glory of  the 
Father (pale purple interspersed with hues of  gold), the royalty and suffering 
of  the Son (purple with a golden clavus), and the life-giving mission of  the 
Spirit (green). Additionally, there is a table (representing fellowship)—or 
rather an altar, giving the icon a liturgical cast—a house (representing the fact 
that “In my Father’s house there are many mansions”), a tree (symbolizing 
the cross), and a cracked rock (implying the outflowing of  water by the Spirit 
of  life). In other words, the table, or the space of  fellowship, exists for us 
as a possibility only because of  the willingness of  the primordial love to go 
beyond itself  and desire the presence of  an “other.” 
As we contemplate the theological meaning of  the icon, we are pointed 
to the idea of  divine bounteousness, where the ecstatic (ek-stasis) rhythm of  
God’s bullitio (immanent “boiling”) and ebullutio (economic “boiling over”) 
is rooted in an aesthetics of  benevolent desire.59 This notion is beautifully 
articulated in Canto XIX of  Dante’s Paradiso, where Dante finds himself  in 
the Primum Mobile, the ninth sphere of  heaven. He is addressed by his guide, 
Beatrice (divine grace), who attests that God does not create to “increase [his] 
good, . . . but that reflections of  his reflection might declare ‘I am.’”60 Thus 
contra Derrida, God’s “gift” of  creation is not an exercise of  hypernarcissism, 
but rather a bestowal of  superabundant goodness through an act of  aesthetic 
57Pavel Florensky, Iconostasis, trans. Donald Sheehan and Olga Andrejev 
(Crestwood: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1996), 68, cited in Gabriel Bunge, The Rublev 
Trinity: The Icon by the Monk-Painter Andrei Rublev, trans. Andrew Louth (Crestwood: St. 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2007), 107.
58For further insights into Rublev’s icons, cf. Jim Forest, “Through Icons: Words 
and Image Together,” in Beholding the Glory: Incarnation through the Arts, ed. Jeremy 
Begbie (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 91-93.
59For a discussion of  bullitio and ebullitio in the theology of  Meister Eckhart, see 
Bernard McGinn, The Mystical Thought of  Meister Eckhart: The Man from Whom God Hid 
Nothing (New York: Crossroad, 2001), 72ff.
60Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy: Paradiso, trans. John Ciardi (New York: New 
American Library, 2003), XXIX, 10-18.
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excess. That, of  course, is one of  Edwards’s main contentions. As we have 
noted in our discussion above, Edwards points to God’s self-glorification as 
the ultimate “end” (terminus) of  creation. The potential charge of  divine self-
absorption is fundamentally subverted by identifying God’s glory and beauty 
precisely with that of  self-giving love. After all, for Edwards, “God’s beauty 
consists in the first instance . . . not in His seeking, receiving, or loving beauty 
but in His exhibiting, communicating, and bestowing beauty by his love of  
being.”61 
This relationship of  beauty and benevolent intent or “virtue” seems 
to be additionally enforced in the Rublev icon through the seemingly 
laconic gesture by the middle angelic figure (the Son) pointing toward the 
cup entailing a lamb’s head.62 It is in that gesture, it would seem, that a link 
between the immanent and economic Trinity is provided, reminding us that 
the symmetry of  beauty and goodness is established foremost through the 
historical enactment of  God’s theodrama; a redemptive “play” in and through 
which beauty is “performed for us” with the climax being the three days of  
Easter.63 Accordingly, in seeking to provide a Christian account of  primary 
beauty we are not permitted to flinch from the index finger of  John the 
Baptist—to appropriate Karl Barth’s meditation on Matthias Grünewald’s 
Isenheim Altarpiece for a moment here64—pointing to the crucified Christ. 
Paradoxically it is there, in the very formlessness of  beauty, that the “consent 
of  Being to being” is most clearly exhibited, giving the divine emanation—
that selfless outpouring of  the triune God as the bonum est diffusivum sui (the 
self-diffusive Good)—its full revelatory expression. In that sense, Rublev’s 
icon reminds us that Christ is indeed “God’s greatest form of  art,”65 “the 
transcendent archetype of  all worldly and human beauty.”66 In truth,
the church has no arguments for its faith more convincing than the form 
of  Christ. . . . Christian thought must remain immovably fixed alongside 
Christ, in his irreducible particularity. . . . What Christian thought offers the 
world is not a set of  “rational” arguments that (suppressing certain of  their 
premises) force assent from others by leaving them, like the interlocutors 
of  Socrates, at a loss for words; rather, it stands before the world principally 
with the story it tells concerning God and creation, the form of  Christ, the 
61Delattre, 169.
62For a Pentecost-centered interpretation of  the icon, see Bunge, 79.
63Begbie, 22. Not, of  course, as the terminus of  redemption, but as the true 
foundation of  glorification.
64See, e.g., Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of  the Word of  God, trans. 
Harold Knight G. T. Thomson (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956), 1.2:125.
65Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Revelation and the Beautiful,” in Explorations in 
Theology: The Word Made Flesh (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1989), 117.
66Balthasar, The Glory of  the Lord, 1:70, cited in Begbie, 22.
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loveliness of  the practice of  Christian charity—and the rhetorical richness 
of  its idiom. Making its appeal first to the eye and heart, as the only way it 
may “command” assent, the church cannot separate truth from rhetoric, or 
from beauty.67
It becomes clearer at this point why the connection of  primary and 
secondary beauty is so central to Edwards. As discussed before, both represent 
a certain kind of  consent, an appealing harmoniousness of  constitutive parts. 
And again, the sort of  harmoniousness that is proper to moral agents over 
against inanimate objects is one that consists in benevolent intent. Thus for 
Edwards, justice and beauty, ethics and aesthetics have a common ontological 
grounding. The same way that “justice concerns right relationships,” so 
also “the beauty God desires for the human community is the proper 
dynamic ordering of  lives in relation to each other. Justice is beautiful.”68 
That is to say, beauty and justice are deeply intertwined.69 Elaine Scarry 
concurs when she claims that “beautiful things give rise to the notion of  
distribution, to a lifesaving reciprocity, to fairness not just in the sense of  
loveliness of  aspect but in the sense of  a symmetry of  everyone’s relation to 
one another.”70 Any treatment or evocation of  natural beauty at the expense of  
a wider transcendental nexus of  values and excellencies presents a flattening 
of  vision that will always be susceptible to manipulation and misuse. While, to 
the certain displeasure of  most postmetaphysical philosophy, this is a recourse 
to metadiscourse, it is one, I believe, that needs to be defended at all cost.71 
Edwards, I think, would agree.
Finally, one of  the more important symbolisms of  the Rublev icon is 
found in its inverted perspective in that its depth is not found behind the three 
angelic figures, but in front of  them, so to speak. It is as if  we were invited 
to step into the space, to join the table of  the trinitarian fellowship. “God 
draws near to us in such a way,” writes Thomas Torrance “as to draw us near 
to himself  within the circle of  his knowing of  himself.”72 It is an expression 
of  ultimate interestedness, but one that is liberating, fully actualizing, and 
67Hart, 3.
68Begbie, 65.
69Jonathan Edwards, “The Excellency Christ,” in Sermons and Discourses, 1734-
1738, ed. M. X. Lesser, The Works of  Jonathan Edwards (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1959), 561.
70Elaine Scarry, On Beauty and Being Just (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1999), 95.
71I am in agreement with Milbank, 1ff., at this point. Also pertinent is Iris 
Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (London: Penguin, 1993).
72Thomas F. Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives: Toward Doctrinal Agreement (Edinburgh: 
T. & T. Clark, 1994), 1, cited in Darrell W. Johnson, Experiencing the Trinity (Vancouver: 
Regent College Publishing, 2002), 60.
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exponentially gracing. The idea of  participation and theosis is clearly evoked 
here, one that is pivotal to Edwards’s theological aesthetics. As noted above, 
it is his contention that “God possesses an effulgent nature that emanates 
throughout created existence and communicates to intelligent creatures the 
desire for knowledge and union with God as the ground of  all being.”73 After 
all, as Edwards’s tirelessly emphasizes, 
God’s respect to the creature’s good, and his respect to himself, is not a 
divided respect; but both are united in one, as the happiness of  the creature 
aimed at is happiness in union with himself. The creature is no further happy 
with this happiness which God makes his ultimate end than he becomes 
one with God. The more happiness the greater union: when the happiness 
is perfect, the union is perfect.74 
It is there, in that “open space” of  the icon, that the Sabbath as a symbol 
of  God’s availability becomes the heart of  Rublev’s symbolic representation, 
although not in the sense that he intended—the biblical doctrine of  the 
Sabbath most certainly was not at the forefront of  his thought—but in the 
sense that the Sabbath epitomizes the hospitable gesture at the focal point 
of  the icon. The Sabbath is the halo of  that space, an intensified elaboration 
of  benevolent Infinity that gifts us with its kenotic immanence. As Jürgen 
Moltmann puts it:
The Sabbath of  God’s creation already contains in itself  the redemptive 
mystery of  God’s indwelling in his creation, although—and just because—
he is wholly concentrated in himself  and rests in himself. The works of  
creation display in God’s act the Creator’s continual transcendence over his 
creation. But the Sabbath of  creation points to the Creator’s immanence in 
his creation, In the Sabbath God joins his eternal presence to his temporal 
creation and, by virtue of  his rest, is there, with that creation and in it. . . . 
[The] sabbath, in its peace and its silence, manifests the eternal God at once 
exoterically and directly as the God who rests in his glory.75
It is in God’s rest that a completely new theme of  liberating and 
empowering gifting is being enacted. As the apex of  God’s created work, 
the final act of  God’s creation, the Sabbath memorializes our dependence 
on prevenient grace—totally irreconcilable with even a hint of  meritorious 
legalism—pointing to a God who creates, acts, invites, blesses, guides, sustains, 
provides, sanctifies, and beautifies.76 As such, it radiates as an effulgent 
backdrop to a peaceable metadiscourse, or rather metapraxis, enacted in 
73Danaher, 205.
74Edwards, “Dissertation,” 533.
75Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of  Creation, trans. 
Margaret Kohl (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985), 280.
76For a rich treatment of  this theme, see Sigve K. Tonstad, The Lost Meaning of  the 
Seventh Day (Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 2009), chap. 24.
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“Immanuel—God with us.” The Sabbath is God’s dramatic response, so to 
speak, to the serpent’s ideological deconstruction of  primary beauty. That 
is to say, it is both the formal and the material cause of  an apologetics of  
“showing”; a shape of  performative theodicy fully to be realized only in “the 
coming beauty of  the kingdom of  God.”77
 
Conclusion
In this article I have sought to address the following questions: How is one 
to speak of  God’s beauty when the very notion of  aesthetic persuasion is 
rendered into an ideological, violence-bent smokescreen? What place is there 
for the aesthetics of  faith when beauty is transmuted into a deceptive front 
for the purpose of  oppression, manipulation, duplicity, and totality? In other 
words, how should one properly emulate the longing to “gaze at the beauty of  
the Lord” (Ps 27:4) when the relationship of  aesthetics and ethics is rendered 
void? Admittedly, these are complicated issues, carrying the weight of  a long 
history of  theological and philosophical reflections and thus need to be 
approached with caution and interdisciplinary awareness. The strategy in this 
article was to pursue two different tracks of  reasoning. On one hand, I have 
suggested that such deconstructive reservations are not necessarily inimical 
to the Christian worldview and its account of  human fallenness. Christianity 
is a profoundly nonsentimental religion and is accordingly realistic about the 
possibility of  malformed beauty and the ways it might become implicated in 
different forms of  subjective, objective, and symbolic violence.78 One only 
needs to recall Augustine’s Confessions, for example, and the way the dialectics 
of  seductive and benevolent beauty is played out in Augustine’s conversion 
story. 
At the same time, I have taken issue with those (postmodern) approaches 
that axiomatically consign any form of  (aesthetic) persuasion to violent 
intent, however implicitly manifested. Quite apart from the question of  
whether such postmetaphysical hermeneutics itself  feeds off  a cleverly 
concealed “ontology of  violence” (Milbank), I have attempted to provide 
an account of  nontotalitarian aesthetics within which God’s benevolence 
is revealed as desire-evoking form (species) and splendor (lumen). Taking my 
cue from Edwards’s account of  primary beauty, I have tried to argue that a 
Christian defense of  the third transcendental cannot simply take the form 
of  a generalized philosophical aesthetics, but must remain irrevocably fixed 
on God’s Trinitarian history of  “God with us.” That is why in distinction 
to Edwards—again, I take this to be more a matter of  emphasis than 
77Jürgen Moltmann, “Messianic Lifestyle,” in The Passion for Life: A Messianic 
Lifestyle (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978), 40.
78For a discussion of  those forms of  violence, see Slavoj Žižek, Violence: Six 
Sideways Reflections (New York: Picador, 2008).
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substance—I have tried to provide a more robust Christological foundation 
to my account, that, together with Augustine,79 affirms that Christ’s kenosis 
is the ultimate revelation of  divine beauty and a theodramatic fusion of  the 
three transcendentals.
It should be clear by now, I trust, that I have simply tried to address 
the “Great Controversy” problematic in a different key. After all, the “Great 
Controversy” between good and evil revolves around the question of  the 
character of  God in that his benevolent intent is creating, offering, promising, 
proclaiming, and redeeming beauty—of  which the Sabbath is the primordial 
memorial—as evidenced in election, creation, redemption, and glorification. 
So when we speak of  a correlation of  God and human flourishing, the 
parameters of  a humanistic God, the announcement of  the evangel of  peace—
in other words, all the multifaceted rhetorical and performative responses 
of  the Christian faith to various subversions of  divine benevolence—we are 
inevitably thrust into the realm of  aesthetic discourse.
Of  course, so much more could be added to this investigation. For one, 
additional space is needed to provide more detailed phenomenological analyses 
of  beauty and justice and their respective interactions. Similarly, the question 
of  why a defense of  benevolence should resort to an account of  theological 
aesthetics also deserves further exploration. That applies as well to various 
issues concerning the subjective turn in aesthetics that are nibbling at the 
outskirts of  this problematic. In the meantime, however, I would like to simply 
gesture toward Thomas Traherne’s words from his Centuries of  Meditation, that 
encapsulate the theological terminus toward which such explorations should 
be ineluctably directed. What matters most, after all, is that
God is life eternal. There must therefore some exceeding great thing 
be always attained in the knowledge of  him. To know God is to know 
goodness. It is to see the beauty of  infinite love. . . . It is to see the king of  
heaven and earth take infinite delight in giving. Whatever knowledge else 
you have of  God, it is but superstition. . . . He is not an object of  terror, but 
delight. To know him therefore, as he is, is to frame the most beautiful idea 
in all world. He delights in our happiness more than we, and is of  all other 
the most lovely object.80
79Balthasar, The Glory of  the Lord, 2:123.
80Thomas Traherne, Waking Up in Heaven: A Contemporary Edition of  Centuries of  
Meditation, ed. David Buresh (Spencerville: Hesed, 2002), 10.
